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Bennett: Airborne Communications

Airborne Communications in
Operation Market Garden
David Bennett
“I see we shall have to do something about your communications.”
General Eisenhower to Major Brian Urquhart, 1942.1

O

peration Market Garden, Field Marshal
B.L.M. Montgomery’s grand attempt to end
the war in 1944, has been ceaselessly analysed
in an attempt to understand the reasons for its
failure. Factors such as the distance of the drop
zones from the objectives in Arnhem, the delay in
resupply, the presence of strong German forces
in the area, as well as the slow progress of XXX
Corps in linking the airborne bridgeheads, are
some of the main reasons cited for the failure
of the operation. Another element often raised
has to do with the failure of communications
equipment at Arnhem. Peter Harclerode, in
his book, Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors, puts
it bluntly: “Much of the blame for 1st Airborne
Division’s demise has been laid at the door of
signals failure as well as the unsuitability of the
radio equipment issued to the division as well
as its failure to work satisfactorily under the
conditions in which it was employed.”2 Lewis
Golden, the adjutant of Divisional Signals during
the operation argues that this was not the case.
Signals actually worked better than could be
expected and that communications failure was
not a principal reason for defeat at Arnhem.3
This article attempts a comprehensive survey
of the role of communications and answers the
question, “How far were poor communications
responsible for the failure of Market Garden?”
In particular, how far did poor communications
contribute to the failure of 1st Airborne Division
to consolidate a bridgehead at the Arnhem road
bridge?
*****

I

n the Second World War, Operation Market
Garden, 17-26 September 1944 was an attempt

by Second British Army (Lieutenant-General
Miles Dempsey) to advance over several Dutch
rivers to establish positions around Nunspeet
on the Ijsselmeer, with bridgeheads over the
River Ijssel to the east. Three corps of Second
Army were to conduct the ground advance, VIII,
XII and XXX, from bridgeheads on the MeuseEscaut Canal. The spearhead of the advance
fell to XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Brian
Horrocks), in the centre between XII Corps on
its left and VIII Corps on its right. Thirty Corps
had three divisions under command, the Guards
Armoured, the 43rd (Wessex) and the 50th
(Northumbrian). The advance of XXX Corps
was facilitated by three airborne divisions and
the First Polish Independent Parachute Brigade
(Major-General Stanislaw Sosabowski) under
the I British Airborne Corps (Lieutenant-General
Frederick Browning); the divisions were the US
82nd (Major-General James Gavin) and 101st
Airborne (Major-General Maxwell Taylor) and
the British 1st Airborne Division (Major-General
Roy Urquhart). The 101st would land on a
stretch of the route to the Ijsselmeer between
Eindhoven and Uden; the 82nd, along with the
Airborne Corps Advance HQ, between the rivers
Maas and Waal and the 1st Airborne north of the
Lower Rhine at Arnhem. The 52nd (Air Portable)
Division was to be flown in to Deelen airfield,
north of Arnhem, on D+5.
The assault plan for 1st Airborne was to land
1st Airlanding and 1st Parachute Brigades
(Brigadiers Hicks and Lathbury respectively)
on the north bank of the Lower Rhine on 17
September (D-Day), for the former to hold the
landing zones while the latter advanced on the
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Arnhem bridges. On D+1, the 4th Parachute
Brigade (Brigadier Hackett) and elements of the
Polish brigade would land, all troops to move to
an extensive bridgehead both north and south
of the Lower Rhine, secured by 1st Parachute
Brigade on D–Day. In fact, only about a single
battalion had secured the north end of the road
bridge and attempts by the division to relieve it
failed. The balance of the Polish brigade was to
drop onto the south bank of the Lower Rhine
on D+2. In the event, it was delayed until D+4;
the Poles dropped around Driel, further west
and further from the road bridge than had been
planned. Crossings of the Lower Rhine to relieve
1st Airborne in Oosterbeek were not successful
and the remains of the division were evacuated
across the Rhine on the night of D+8-9, mainly
in the motorized stormboats of the 23rd Field
Company, RCE.

The Signals Plan and Infrastructure
in Market Garden

T

he Signals plan for Market Garden provided
for communications between several
headquarters:
– Second Army and XXX Corps to British
Airborne Corps Headquarters (Advance, Main
and Rear) and the US 10lst Airborne;
– The British Airborne Corps to the three
airborne divisions;
– Second Army and XXX Corps to the Airborne
Corps and the three airborne divisions for air
support;
– From the Airborne Corps and the American
airborne divisions to the base resupply
organizations; and
– A network for outside artillery support for the
airborne divisions.4

The Signals Plan for the Airborne Corps
entailed the establishment of communication
between Corps Advance HQ near Nijmegen and
Corps Rear in England. Corps Main HQ was to be
cut out of the communication link until it joined
Advance by road from Brussels.
Most of the communications problems of
Market Garden were due to the shape and size
of the operation and the great haste in which
it was planned. At its most basic, the problem
was that HQ First Allied Airborne Army was not
an operational command so that signals had to

be inaugurated by commands that varied from
operation to operation. In the case of British First
Airborne Corps, the Signals component had only
just been established as a static formation; it had
been designed for a smaller, traditional airborne
operation, which was cancelled. Corps Signals
had to be rapidly enlarged and improvised for
the operation, in order for a signals component
to go in with the Corps Advance HQ on D–Day,
17 September. The result was poorly trained
and inexperienced operators with inadequate
equipment and insufficient information to
make contact with other units.5 Some of the
insufficiency of information was put down to
the need for signals security. Overall signals
planning was the responsibility of the Chief
Signals Officer (CSO) Second Army. There was
a large proliferation of headquarters in England,
Belgium and the Netherlands, requiring detailed
information on frequencies, cyphers, call signs
and codes. Since the airborne force was mixed,
US elements were added to Corps Signals, too
hastily trained to be effective, particularly the air
support parties. American High Power wireless
equipment was available; but training in this was
entirely inadequate and it could not in any case
be transported in great numbers, since its bulk
would have involved a change in the air plan, not
possible in the short time involved.
Signals planning was slight. Brigadier R.G.
Moberly, the head of Corps Signals, attended the
first planning conference at Second Army HQ in
Belgium but had no subsequent contact with his
colleagues at Second Army or its three corps. All
of these HQs were in the process of reestablishing
their own communications after the pursuit of
the Germans and the shift of XXX Corps from
the Antwerp sector to Bourg Leopold, behind the
start line for the ground advance.
The problems encountered by 1st
Airborne were deeper than this. British Army
communications had lagged behind the other two
services between the wars so that the infantry had
to use obsolete or sub-standard equipment. The
problem was compounded when such equipment
was transferred to the Airborne with special
conditions and demands of its own. Divisional
Signals had made repeated requests for new
and better signals equipment. Several British
paratroop commanders whose forces had fought
as ground troops expected the signal equipment
not to work.
39
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This wireless diagram shows Corps
signals only, not the various other radio
networks operating (or not) in Market
Garden. There was no effective contact
through Corps Signals between British
1st Airborne and the British Airborne
Corps until D+3. The US 101st Airborne
Division had no radio contact with the
Airborne Corps and made contact with
XXX Corps only on the morning of D+2.
Source: Report on Operations “Market”
and “Garden”, Signal Report, Index A,
Wireless Diagram, Operation “Market”,
Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum
London, PI AV 20/31/6, Archive p.89.

Diagram supplied by author

was established through Corps
Signals, on D+2.

In addition to Corps Signals, there were a
number of other communication networks:
Phantom Net (GHQ Signal Liaison Regiment
Detachments). This network connected Second
Army with the Airborne Corps and the divisions,
with limited success. It is a mark of British
independence from Eisenhower’s Supreme
Headquarters that a mere divisional HQ, that
of 1st Airborne, had a Phantom link with the
War Office in London. The senior British officer
who supervised the War Office connection was
Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Heathcoat-Amory, a
future Chancellor of the Exchequer. On D–Day,
Airborne Corps made contact with Second Army
through Corps Signals only by way of XXX Corps.
On D+l, Airborne Corps established communi
cation with Second Army through Phantom,
which remained operating after regular contact

Even then, Second Army
was not happy with the state
of communications. There had
been no planning staff from
First Allied Airborne Army
attached to Second Army
prior to the operation, only a
liaison officer. Owing to signals
congestion and the number of
headquarters in England and
Europe, communication with the
Airborne remained poor, so that
the state of paratroop operations
from hour to hour was not
known. This was disconcerting,
but Dempsey, the Second Army
commander, did not in any case
have a firm grip on the airborne operations.
When he met Major-General Roy Urquhart
of 1st Airborne on D-11, he seemed unaware
of Urquhart’s battle plan and considered
the isolation of the two brigades at ArnhemOosterbeek “almost inevitable.”6
Phantom also had mobile patrols. One
reached the Poles at Driel on D+6, initially
without successful transmissions. On D+7–9,
the patrol made contact with the Phantom
station in Oosterbeek (Lieutenant Neville Hay)
and was able to report to the Airborne Corps
on the evacuation.7 The verdict in one of the
early histories,8 that “information from the 1st
Airborne, coming through well and accurately,
was almost exclusively handled by Phantom” is
an exaggeration of the correct point that Phantom
worked better than Corps Signals.
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US Air Support Signals Teams. Prior to D‑Day,
liaison between the Airborne and the British
Second Tactical Air Force (2nd TAF) on the
continent had been very poor. The divisions were,
however, each provided with two air support
signals teams, flown in by American Waco glider.
These teams were completely unfamiliar with the
equipment and as such, untrained. They were
equipped to order air support from Second Army9
and were also provided with Very High Frequency
(VHF) sets to contact the overflying support
aircraft. There was no direct contact between
the Airborne Corps and 83 Group, 2nd TAF. The
system did not work well. For much of the time,
air demands to Second Army had to be relayed
through XXX Corps, and no contact between
the airborne and the air forces was ever made
through the VHF sets. No.83 Group, getting its
information from Second Army, then had to sort
and prioritize air demands after many hours of
delay, relying on a six-figure map reference or on
coloured smoke and identification panels, not to
pinpoint targets but to identify Allied troops. The
airborne 75 mm pack howitzers had no coloured
smoke to identify targets, so air support could not
be directed in this way until red or blue smoke
arrived with the 52nd Division.10 This division
was never deployed. The 1st Division was limited
to target pinpointing by XXX corps artillery when
that Corps had joined up with the Airborne.11 To
cap it all, 1st Airborne sets were wrongly tuned,
then destroyed by artillery fire, along with the
VHF equipment.12 The system of “contact cars”
and “Cabranks” of fighter-bombers, which had
proved so deadly in Normandy, was largely absent
from Market Garden.
6080 and 6341 Light Warning Units, RAF.
These mobile radar units, to give warning of
approaching German night bombers, were
destined for Corps HQ but in fact went into
Arnhem on the second lift. All four gliders
carrying the equipment were lost and a large
majority of the personnel taken prisoner. No
commentator has connected the devastating
German night raid on Eindhoven, D+2-3 with
the lack of radar warning; the fact is that the raid
was unopposed.
The Jedburgh Net. The Airborne Corps and
the divisions were equipped with Jedburgh
stations on the Dutch Resistance network. The
1st Airborne’s Jedburgh radio team arrived at the
Arnhem bridge, minus the US Technical Sergeant

and the equipment, which had been lost on the
landing zone. As for the two American divisions,
most of their information came from Resistance
runners and through the civilian phone system.
The Dutch Phone System. The corps and
each of the divisions had Dutch liaison officers
to facilitate contact with the Resistance. The
instructions for the operation had made it
clear that, while the Dutch Resistance had
been penetrated by the Germans, use was to
be made of the local Resistance as guides and
as intelligence sources.13 But 1st Airborne was
so suspicious of the Dutch that they were very
slow to use them either as para-militaries or as
agents, including their greatest asset – the phone
system.14 The Dutch phone system was efficient
and modern, extending to the Dutch East Indies.15
The Dutch were able to utilize three phone
networks: the national Ryks Telefoon system; the
Gelderland Provincial Electricity Board (Dutch
acronym PGEM) private network with its head
office in Nijmegen; and a clandestine network
operated by Resistance technicians whereby they
could call many places in the Netherlands without
going through an operator. The Resistance thus
had a comprehensive network which was very
effective when all three routings were used and
which could survive disruption at key points.
One such disruption occurred on D+3, when
the British blew up the Post Office Exchange
in Oosterbeek and the Germans reoccupied
the Arnhem exchanges.16 The Dutch were still
able to use the PGEM network, in some cases
in conjunction with Ryks Telefoon, to reach key
points in the Arnhem area such as Wageningen,
Bennekom, Ede and Doetinchem. Messages sent
from inside the Arnhem perimeter received,
however, little response from the Nijmegen nodal
point.17 Be that as it may, 1st Airborne made no
attempt to convey to corps, via the phone system,
the difficulties over supply, nor the urgency of
relief. The PGEM link between Nijmegen and
occupied Arnhem continued until 16 November.
Dutch agents inside the 82nd Airborne
Division’s landing area used the phone system
early on D+1 to inform the 82nd at 1040 hours18
that “the Germans are winning over the British
at Arnhem,” the first indication that 1st Airborne
was in serious trouble. The 101st also used
the phone system: a Dutch operator heard an
American voice trying to contact Valkenswaard,
41
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when that centre was still in German hands.19
The VIII Corps liaison officer at the 101st used
the phone system to contact corps HQ when the
radio proved to be unreliable.20
Carrier Pigeons. Each of the airborne divisions
used carrier pigeons for communication,
particularly 1st Airborne.21 The birds, however,
displayed a disturbing tendency to go on strike
once released;22 though one pigeon from the 1st
Airborne, released on September 25th, did reach
VIII Corps, presumably uninvited.23 One pigeon
was released by the 101st on D+1, stating that
the gliders had landed and giving map references
of the assembly area.24 The 1st Airborne report
of 10 January 1945 recorded that the division
took along 82 pigeons of which 14 returned to
lofts in the London area with messages, eleven
without; three returned to Airborne Rear HQ.
The report concluded that “It is really doubtful
whether pigeons are worth taking on future
airborne operations similar to this.”
Land lines, runners and dispatch riders.
Whenever wireless communications failed or were
non-existent, more use would have to be made
of more traditional forms of communication.
The commander of the British 1st Parachute
Brigade Signals Section, having experienced
very poor results on signals exercises, took
on a greater complement of field telephones
and cable than usual, anticipating a possible
failure of radio communications.25 When the
Oosterbeek perimeter was formed, a network of
land lines was established; but it did not reach
all companies and the cables were frequently
severed by artillery and mortar fire.26
The Artillery Net. Artillery communications
worked well in Market Garden. On the evening
of D–Day, about 750 paratroopers under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost
of 2nd Parachute Battalion had occupied the
north end of the Arnhem road bridge but they
were isolated from the balance of 1st Airborne
in Oosterbeek. On the morning of D+1, the
artillery link opened between Divisional HQ Royal
Artillery and 3rd Airlanding Light Battery HQ at
the Arnhem road bridge. Not only did Frost get
artillery support but the link enabled Division to
open communications with 2nd Battalion for the
first time since it left the Drop Zone on D‑Day.
Using the powerful 19HP sets, Divisional HQ
Royal Artillery then contacted the 64th Medium

Regiment Royal Artillery at about 0930 hours
on D+4, again resulting in very effective artillery
support for 1st Airborne but also opening a relay
to XXX Corps for the first time. However, this
link was poor at night and had its limitations,
as will be seen.

Signals in Action

U

pon landing on D–Day, Corps Signals with
the Advance HQ established contact with
82nd Airborne and this was soon supplemented
by a land line, not without casualties. Corps
contacted the 101st Airborne on the air support
net, since the latter’s Corps Signals unit had not
arrived by glider.27 After a brief contact with 1st
Airborne, communication was essentially lost
until early on D+3, when both Corps Signals and
Phantom were in operation. On D+3, the British
began a system of land lines between XXX Corps,
which had arrived at Nijmegen in the area of the
82nd, and the Airborne Corps.

The 101st Signals plan was based on that of
a previous operation, Linnet I, with additional
links to XXX Corps and Second Army. A Signals
Company of 31 men was established at Zon and
began to lay land lines to the regiments and the
Artillery HQ. Since the British Corps Signals
unit did not arrive with the gliders on D+1, the
signallers made contact with the divisional rear
base in England, who contacted XXX Corps via
Second Army, though this tortuous link was
poor.28 A radio liaison team of four men from
British (Army) No.1 Commando Brigade also
dropped on D–Day; the details are not well
known.29 But on the evening of D+1, General
Taylor still had not made radio contact with
XXX Corps, under whose command his division
would come, once the ground link-up had been
made. Second Army did not respond to queries
about XXX Corps on the afternoon of D–Day.
Distances were too great for the 101st to contact
XXX Corps artillery. Calls on Phantom with
Market Garden codes were not recognized and it
was not until the morning of D+2, using known
British codes, that the Americans made contact
with XXX Corps. On D+1, the 101st made direct
radio contact with the 82nd Airborne and, it is
said, with 1st Airborne.30 The 506th Parachute
Infantry Regiment, entering Eindhoven on the
morning of D+l, made contact at 1130 hours
with their own liaison group at XXX Corps, then
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This is the first page of the specification
notes for the No.19 Wireless set made
by Captain Ivor Green, of REME (Royal
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers).
The No.19 set was used by the artillery
net in Market Garden, providing a link
between 1st Airborne Division and
Lieutenant-Colonel Frost’s battalion
at the Arnhem bridge. On D+4, the
artillery link was established between
1st Airborne Division and the 64th
Medium Artillery Regiment. Not only
was this effective for artillery support
but the link provided a relay to XXX
Corps and to Second Army for air
support to 1st Airborne.

The aim in Market Garden was to bring
responsibility for the flanks of XXX Corps “under
a separate command.” To this end, 50th Division
of XXX Corps was brought under VIII Corps at
1200 hours on D+1, before the latter corps had
even secured its bridgehead over the MeuseEscaut Canal. The 101st Airborne had a liaison
officer from VIII Corps. Radio contact between the
two formations was unreliable, but this was no
great loss, since VIII Corps was in no position to
provide practical help and co-ordination on the
right flank until D+5. The 101st Airborne in fact
came under the command of XII Corps on D+6,
the VIII Corps liaison officer remaining with the
division. Radio contact between the 101st and
XII Corps seems to have been satisfactory since
there was one case of successful co-ordination
of operations in the XII Corps sector on D+2.

Image supplied by author

advancing to meet them. This
was achieved through Orange
Net, a system using a single
frequency for all levels which the
signallers had worked out for the
Normandy operation. They found
out that XXX Corps was still five
miles south of Eindhoven and
encountering opposition from
German 88s. General Taylor
directed that the British be
advised to put bridging engineers
at the head of their column to
repair the Zon bridge. That the
British did so with commendable
speed and efficiency was due to
American foresight and, at last,
good communications.
The experience of the 101st is revealing. Where
the Americans used their own communications
system and their own personnel, things went
smoothly. This was also true of the 101st air
support prior to joining up with XXX Corps. But
where there was a crossover or interface between
national systems and personnel, communications
were usually less than satisfactory, again an
indication of hasty planning and inadequate
training. The point that solely national ground-air
communications systems worked well was made
in the 21st Army Group report, under whose
command Second Army and the Airborne Army
came.31 Air support was summoned directly from
the US Army Air Forces and not via the Airborne
Corps or Second Army. That things sometimes
went wrong was not because of a faulty radio
communications system. The P-47 Thunderbolts
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British 1st Airborne Division planned to use the No.22
wireless set to communicate with the British Airborne
Corps. Unfortunately, the six-mile range of the set could
not reach the 15 miles to Corps Headquarters. Left: A
No.22 Set in a specially designed container for airborne
drops. Above: A No.22 Set mounted in an airborne jeep.

started to strafe American positions before the
troops laid out identification panels: the 101st
had as yet no artillery to identify targets and
in any case no coloured smoke shells for the
howitzers.32
The problem with 1st Airborne was that
Divisional Signals were using No.22 radio sets
which had a maximum range of six miles when
Corps HQ was 15 miles distant. 33 Reliable
communication would only be possible when
1st Airborne HQ moved into Arnhem and thus
closer to Airborne Corps HQ, after the second
airborne “lift” on D+1. The No.22 sets were
mobile on jeeps; they required a hefty charger
for the accumulators. But the divisional HQ
never did get to Frost’s positions at the Arnhem
road bridge. Thus Major-General Urquhart had
to rely on the Phantom net. His messages were
not acknowledged and he had no way of knowing
whether they were received. In fact, the Jedburgh
station in Ede received the news that Urquhart’s
Phantom connection with the War Office had been
cut; this occurred on D+2 or perhaps earlier.34
His operators were given insufficient information
to contact XXX Corps, even when they were in
range. He eventually established contact with
XXX Corps through the artillery link, using the
larger No.19HP sets with a voice range of 25
miles. This link worked well and to good practical
effect. When 1st Polish Parachute Brigade landed

at Driel and 130th Brigade of 43rd Division came
within range, the 1st Airborne established contact
with both.

Signals in Action:
The Case of 1st Airborne Division

O

n D-Day, communications with the Airborne
Corps had been almost non-existent. Though
there was some contact between 1st Division and
Airborne Corps Rear HQ in England35 which has
been well analysed by Lewis Golden,36 there was
essentially no contact between Urquhart and
Browning until a series of situation reports were
received by Browning’s Airborne Corps HQ, now
designated Main, at Groesbeek, starting at 0800
hours on D+3. The link was augmented through
the artillery net on the following day. Urquhart
attempted communications with London through
Phantom and through the BBC journalists’
link, but the messages were usually garbled
or unintelligible, owing to competition with a
powerful German station, possibly with the help
of a radio jamming station in Ede.37 This link did
work occasionally because Brereton, the Allied
Airborne Army commander, visiting the American
Airborne in the Eindhoven-Zon area, received
news of the supply situation of 1st Airborne on
the morning of D+3, which had reached his HQ
in England via the BBC link.38 Even Captain
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Within the division, things were worse.
Communications had broken down completely
by 2130 hours on D-Day. Brigadier Lathbury
of the 1st Parachute Brigade did not wait long
enough for his jeep-borne No.22 rover set to
open so he took off to the brigade front, then
advancing on the road bridge, with a No.68P set,
which had a range of three miles.39 His battalions
were equipped with such sets, which were oneman pack sets operating on two frequencies
with replaceable dry cell batteries. When Major
Anthony Deane-Drummond, second-in-command
of Divisional Signals, had expressed concern in
1943 about the short range of such sets, he was
assured that the divisional perimeter in airborne
operations would be no more than three miles
in diameter.40 Since this was, conveniently, the
range of the No.68P sets, Deane-Drummond
thought that the figure was produced simply to
shut him up.
Within the battalions, the companies and
platoons used very short range SCR-536 sets.
The reconnaissance squadron used its own radio
net; there never was an effective link within the
Squadron, with Division or 1st Parachute Brigade
on D-Day.

LCMSDS Photo Collection

Below: The SCR-536 was a short-range walkie-talkie
that did not work effectively during Market Garden. Right:
One of the ad hoc signals links used by 1st Airborne to
communicate with the outside world included sending
messages to the War Office through the BBC net, which
used morse keys and the No.76 Set.

Two things were essential. The first was a link
between 1st Parachute Brigade heading for
the Arnhem bridge and divisional HQ. This
broke down soon after 1545 hours, when 1st
Parachute Brigade moved off to Arnhem; it was
not reestablished on D-Day. The second was a
link between the brigade and its three battalions.
Lathbury was separated both from Frost and his
own Brigade Major on the bridge. The brigadier
was with 3rd Battalion; he made contact with
Frost’s 2nd Battalion on the bridge and by 2130
hours both Lathbury and Urquhart, who was
with him, learned that 2nd Battalion was on the
bridge, which was intact.41
It might seem that poor communications were
responsible for 1st Parachute Brigade’s failure to
arrive at the Arnhem Bridge in strength. MajorGeneral David Belchem42 blamed communication
breakdown for the failure of 1st and 3rd
Battalions to concentrate for the advance. The
SCR-536 sets seem also to have been ineffectual,
since companies made no use of information to
communicate successful routes to the bridge.43
Major Tatham-Warter of “A” Company, 2nd
Battalion, for example, had no confidence in
such sets and used bugle calls instead – to good
effect.44 In 156th Battalion of 4th Parachute
Brigade, which had arrived on D+1, the walkietalkies worked intermittently over short distances
in the daytime and not at all at night.45

LCMSDS Photo Collection

Eric Mackay’s engineers besieged at the Arnhem
bridge received the BBC public transmissions
from London, though it was disconcerting to hear
that they had been relieved!
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Airborne would still have had to keep the route
open until after the second lift on D+1, which
brings us back to an old controversy of whether it
was a landing too far from the bridge, the absence
of a second lift, or German opposition that
caused the failure. Though there were serious
communication difficulties in 1st Parachute
Brigade on D-Day, the facts and indications seem
to bear out Lewis Golden’s contention that signals
were not to blame for the failure to get to the
bridge in strength. Similarly with 4th Parachute
Brigade, where communications with divisional
HQ, using No.22 and No.68P sets, broke down
during the Brigade’s retreat back to Oosterbeek
on D+2: orders were given by Urquhart in person
or Hackett acted on his own initiative. Any errors
were not due to the signals failure.49

LCMSDS Photo Collection

The truth is multi-faceted. First, there would have
had to have been enough information passed
to ascertain that Frost’s route, while difficult,
was still open. It was in fact still open, albeit
very tenuously, on the morning of D+1 because
Major Munford made the trip from the bridge
to divisional HQ and back. Frost contacted
Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie of Lathbury’s 1st
Battalion in the evening of D-Day, telling him
that he needed reinforcements. Dobie then made
the correct decision to abandon his assigned
northern route to the bridgehead and move
south-east “to help Johnnie at the bridge.”46
Lathbury with Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch at 3rd
Battalion HQ was in touch with his brigade major
at the bridge. Tony Hibbert, the brigade major,
told Martin Middlebrook in the early 1990s that
he had informed Lathbury that 2nd Battalion’s
route had been clear a short time earlier. This,
together with the news that the road bridge was
intact, took place at about 2130 hours, just
before the radio failed.47 But Lathbury declined
to switch his axis of advance, nor did he follow
up “C” Company’s route to the bridge, which had
been reconnoitred and found to be clear as far as
the reconnaissance went. Instead, 3rd Battalion
halted until 0430 hours on D+l.48 If 1st Parachute
Brigade had arrived in strength at the bridge, 1st

The Critique of Signals at Arnhem

L

ewis Golden, who had been adjutant of
divisional signals, produced a definitive
critique of signals at Arnhem in l984, on which
much of the preceding rests. Golden made two
principal contentions, both contrary to previous
accounts: that signals actually worked better
than could be expected and that communications
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failure was not a principal reason for defeat at
Arnhem.50 As for the contention that signals
worked better then could be expected: the
division was using unsuitable equipment, with
rough handling owing to constant loading
and unloading; the hazards of dropping and
landing; the difficulties of tuning sets under
battle conditions and battle damage itself. The
iron in the sandy soil at Arnhem, buildings and
trees impeded both transmission and reception.
Shortage of the replaceable batteries for the 68P
sets was also a problem.51
There is one area, however, where Golden seems
to have overstated his case. Over the dearth of air
support for 1st Airborne, he advanced the usual
explanations of bad weather and the prohibition
of air support during airborne operations and
supply. But the tone of his remarks, that air
support was “apparently…not available” and that
the air force “apparently found themselves able
to help”52 indicates that he wanted to blame the
RAF for poor air support. The US Air Support
Signals Teams’ equipment had been destroyed,
placing reliance on a “circuitous radio route in
the absence of a direct air support link.” This,
Golden claimed, was “clearly” not responsible
for the withholding of air support until D+6.
Golden, who had researched the signal logs

exhaustively, cited only four examples of air
support requested through the artillery link, one
from Airborne Corps on D+2; one on D+4 from
1st Airborne; and two more from the same source
on D+8. For the first and second, there was no
response; the third was refused and the fourth
was honoured. From this, it can hardly inferred
that it poor air support was the fault of the RAF.
The second signal is intriguing. The request was
made at 1700 hours on D+4 for air support at
1830 hours; if not then, it was not wanted at all.
Consider the route. The 64th Medium Artillery
link was already overloaded with messages other
than those concerning artillery support. The
message would then have to go to XXX Corps,
then to Second Army, thence to 83 Group, 2nd
TAF, then to the airfields, with allowance for takeoff and flying time. It is not reasonable to deny
that the circuitous radio route was responsible for
the unavailability of air support 90 minutes after
the request. Even with ideal communications, the
turnaround time for air support from request to
delivery was one hour.53
On the Phantom net, four further requests can be
identified. The first of these was a general request,
without map references, on the morning of D+1;
this was passed to Second Army. The second, on
the afternoon of D+3, specified four six-figure

The fighting around the Arnhem bridge was vicious, as witnessed by this oblique air photo which shows the burnt-out
vehicles of the German SS unit which attempted to cross the bridge.
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Left: A British paratrooper at Arnhem attempts to make
use of a No.68P set. This set proved largely inadequate
as it had a range of only three miles and suffered from
shortage of batteries.

map references; Second Army acknowledged
and promised air support. The third was an
urgent request, without map references, on the
morning of D+4 for “maximum air support”; this
message was possibly identical to the one sent
at 1700 hours via the artillery link. The fourth,
with three sets of map references, was late in the
morning of D+5; this was quickly acknowledged
by Second Army and turned down on account of
the weather.54
Golden’s second contention, that communication
breakdown was not a principal cause of the
failure at Arnhem, was also correct. The only
reservation concerns the supply run on D+2,
when Urquhart was unable to get a message
through, advising that the drop zone was in
enemy hands. This has been challenged by John
Baynes, who quotes the 1st Airborne Divisional
Signals Report which recorded that links were
open to the War Office via the BBC net, with 1st
Airborne Corps using No.76 sets with morse
keys and with Second Army through Phantom.
This, however, does not prove the messages were
received, especially as messages the next day were
received, and acted upon. The fact that Urquhart
seems not to have been advised of the two final
supply runs from Brussels was not because of
a communications failure. The reason for the
failure of the supply runs was partly that the
drop area was so small and partly because the
Germans had latched on to the British supply
plan and laid out identification panels at the
right time and place each day.55 The supply pilots
were instructed to ignore ground signals other
than those designated. It is also possible that the

LCMSDS Photo Collection

LCMSDS Photo Collection

Right: Paratroopers of “C” Section, 1st Airborne Divisional
Signals, gather on DZ “X” shortly after their drop at
Oosterbeek on 17 September 1944. The soldier in the
centre is using the SCR-536 walkie-talkie.

Germans used captured Rebecca-Eureka radio
beacons. When the retired Dutch Artillery Colonel
Boeree interrogated the German commanders
after the war, both Rauter, the SS Security chief
for the Netherlands, and one of the officers of
Helle’s Dutch SS battalion at Arnhem told him
that a British officer was captured on D-Day with
the plans for the ground markers and smoke
signals.56 The Germans also listened in to British
radio signals on No.68P sets which captured
paratroopers had not destroyed.
The failure of supply to 1st Airborne was
not essentially due to the failure of radio
communications, though the British
communication system for supply was still not
good. Because the American divisions had a
direct radio link to England, they could quickly
call upon supplies to be landed in the right
place and by units immediately available on the
continent, namely the US 8th Air Force. Urquhart,
however, had no direct radio link to the supply
bases in England, a fact that Golden did not
mention.

The Improvement in 1st Airborne
Communications on D+3

A

great improvement in communications
between 1st Airborne Division and the
outside world started on D+3. This was also
the day on which the Oosterbeek perimeter was
formed, which reduced the importance of radio
communications within the division. An attempt
to improve 1st Airborne Division’s internal
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communications had begun on D-Day. In the
afternoon, the second- in-command of Divisional
Signals, Major Anthony Deane-Drummond sent
out a jeep with a No.22 set to try to establish a
relay between the moving 1st Parachute Brigade
HQ and the signals base. Some faint signals faded
away altogether. At 1730 hours, a despatch rider
was sent out to notify 1st Parachute Brigade “to
change over the command net frequency to the
frequency allotted to the 76 set group, known as
the B wave, which was to be established between
the headquarters and the brigades for the
passage of cypher traffic by morse code.”57 This
expedition failed, so Deane-Drummond himself
set out at 0715 hours on D+1; he joined up with
1st Battalion. In his own account, he made radio
contact with Major Hibbert at the bridge and told
him of the frequency change. But since there was
no contact between Hibbert and the division, he
elected to move forward to the bridge to supervise
the radio connections with the divisional HQ. In
doing so, he had to take command of some 1st
Battalion troops whose company commander had
been killed. Deane-Drummond was eventually
captured after attempting to return to his signals
base.58 Contact with the bridge on the B wave was
eventually established at 1000 hours on D+3;
meanwhile, the artillery link was used. Frost did
get a message to XXX Corps at about 1000 hours
on D+2, stating his position and receiving a reply
that the Nijmegen bridge would be attacked at
1200 hours, with no time of relief estimated.59
The assaults on the Nijmegen bridge later that
day were unsuccessful.
There were several unsatisfactory contacts
between 1st Airborne and Corps Advance, Main
and Rear HQ prior to D+3 but none resulted in
significant information being exchanged. The
first definite contact between 1st Division and
Airborne Corps Signals was at 0300 hours on
D+3, when Urquhart advised Browning’s HQ
of the change in the Drop Zone for the Polish
paratroopers south of the Lower Rhine and of
a new drop zone for the day’s supply run. Both
messages got through to the airfields in England.
The Poles’ drop was again cancelled while the
supply aircraft were directed on a zone 200 yards
west of Urquhart’s HQ at the Hartenstein Hotel.
From 0800 hours, Urquhart was able to send
a series of situation reports to Airborne Corps
HQ. One message was received by Browning at
0950 hours, stating that 1st Airborne required

“immediate relief.” Again, Urquhart signalled at
1505 hours saying that the situation was serious
for 1st Parachute Brigade at the bridge, that he
was forming a perimeter and that “relief essential
both areas earliest possible.” He also reported
the ferry crossing held. By the evening, it was
known by all commands that 1st Parachute
Brigade was isolated at the bridge and could
not be resupplied. It was also known that the
resupply zones for the division were almost
entirely in enemy hands, that the fighting was
intense and the position of 1st Airborne was
not good. At 0900 hours on D+4, Horrocks
got a message from Urquhart’s HQ via the 64th
Medium Artillery Regiment that the north end
of the road bridge was still held, and reiterating
that the Driel-Heaveadorp ferry was in British
hands. Neither was in fact correct. The previous
message on D+3 had said that Driel-Heveadorp
was a Class 24 ferry capable of carrying six tanks
per load, a great exaggeration. At 2045 hours on
D+3, Airborne Corps Rear HQ in England sent a
message to Exfor Main, Eisenhower’s HQ, stating
that the British retained control of the ferry.60
For this reason, Sosabowski’s Polish brigade
prepared to aim for the ferry crossing rather than
trying to fight their way along the south bank of
the river to the road bridge. Sosabowski was in
fact informed after dawn on D+4, the day the
drop finally took place, that the ferry was intact.
The ferry was still in use during daylight on D+3,
being moored at Heveadorp when not in use.61
Two patrols that night reported to Urquhart’s
HQ that the ferry was either disabled or gone.62
However, the 1st Airborne war diary, records
the return of one of the patrols at 0340 hours
on D+4; but not the loss of the ferry.63 The Poles
on the south bank in the evening of D+4 saw no
sign of the ferry.
In a Phantom message sent at 0515 hours on
D+4, Urquhart reported that troops north of the
ferry had been withdrawn, an understatement
of what his patrols had reported during the
night. This message was, however, not logged
until 1415 hours, the time that the Poles took
off from their bases in England. In his memoirs,
Urquhart strongly implies that he knew the ferry
had been lost before about 1715 hours on D+4,
the time of the Polish parachute drop.64 Urquhart
reported the loss of the ferry in two Phantom
messages, at 0830 hours and at 0931 hours on
D+5.65 At 1900 hours on D+5, Airborne Corps
Rear reported the ferry’s loss to Eisenhower’s
49
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Long after Operation Market
Garden was over, the evidence
remained. Those gliders that
survived the landing and were
not burned by the Germans lay
in Dutch fields for months after
the fighting had ended.

HQ and the British War Office. This news had
come both from Urquhart and via both the Poles
and Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, Urquhart’s
Chief of Staff, on the radio of the troop of the 2nd
Household Cavalry in Driel.
Within the division, Urquhart got a radio message
from 4th Parachute Brigade soon after 0730
hours on D+3, stating that the brigade would
be unable to reach the divisional HQ and so
take part in 1st Parachute Brigade’s continuing
efforts to reach Frost at the road bridge. Both
brigades had in fact been virtually destroyed the
day before. So when Major Freddie Gough at the

road bridge contacted Urquhart on the civilian
phone line shortly after 0800 hours, he was told
that he could expect no relief from the division,
only from XXX Corps coming up from the
south.66 After that, two-way radio communication
seems to have broken down. One message from
the bridge, received in the evening, suggested
continuing resistance. The result was that both
Urquhart and Horrocks at XXX Corps could only
assume that the north end of the bridge was still
held; Urquhart told Airborne Corps in the evening
of D+4 that there had been no news from the
Arnhem bridge for 24 hours.67
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Conclusions

T

here has been intense debate as to how far
poor communications contributed to failure
at Arnhem. So far as the relief of 1st Airborne by
XXX Corps is concerned, there are two issues:
(1) knowledge by the two units of the situation
at the north end of the Arnhem road bridge;
and (2) knowledge on the part of the relieving
force of the state of the Driel-Heveadorp ferry.
When the advance of the Guards Armoured up
the Nijmegen-Arnhem road was stalled on the
afternoon of D+4, Horrocks ordered a move
along an alternative route through Oosterhout
and Valburg to Driel. The purpose of the offensive
was still to move “in the direction of Arnhem”; the
state of the ferry was not a consideration. The
Poles’ parachute drop the same afternoon was in
the vicinity of Driel. The occasion for this choice
of drop zones was not the state of the ferry but
the fact that the original drop zone further east
was occupied by the Germans. Sosabowski was
somewhat reassured that his parachute drop
had sound tactical purpose when he learned in
the morning that the ferry was intact. However,
it had in fact been lost the night before. The first
thought of the first unit of XXX Corps to arrive
at Driel in force on D+5, the 5th Battalion, The
Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, was to move
east to the road bridge, but this was not possible
due to the strength of the German blocking line.
Crossings of the Lower Rhine were to be at Driel
with assault boats and not via the road bridge,
a fact that was conveyed to Urquhart in Arnhem
on D+5. So the presumptions conveyed to XXX
Corps on the condition of 1st Division at the
road bridge and the state of the Driel-Heveadorp
ferry had no practical effect on tactical planning.
The Allied troops in Driel could be employed in
crossing the Lower Rhine or in reaching the road
bridge. There never was any attempt to reach the
road bridge from Driel, nor did the supposed
holding of the north end of the bridge dampen the
plan to cross the Lower Rhine at Driel.
Within the 1st Airborne Division, it has been
seen how poor communications in 1st Parachute
Brigade on D-Day cannot be held responsible for
the failure of 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions to
reach the 2nd at the Arnhem road bridge. After
that, inadequate communications within 1st
Airborne Division certainly had a detrimental
effect on operations. When Brigadier John
Hackett arrived with 4th Parachute Brigade on

D+1, he found Brigadier Hicks of 1st Airlanding
Brigade commanding the division in the absence
of Urquhart, who was out of touch with his
headquarters until the morning of D+2. Hicks
told Hackett that the battalions of 1st Parachute
Brigade, still heading for the road bridge were
“fighting on their own.” This was part of the
mess that Hackett considered the division to
be in, but Hicks cannot be blamed for the fact
that communications with the battalions of 1st
Parachute Brigade continued to be problematic.
Hackett’s 10th Parachute Battalion was added
to those of 1st Parachute Brigade advancing on
the road bridge. But Hackett, evidently, wanted
his battalion back. Urquhart, now returned to
his HQ, sent a radio message to 10th Battalion
at 0900 hours on D+2, ordering it not to
advance on the road bridge but to assemble for
a move north. (Whether this was good tactics,
need not concern us.) An advance, to form a
bridgehead with its perimeter well north of the
Arnhem bridge, had been the original mission
of 4th Parachute Brigade. This message was
not received. Sometime before 1100 hours, the
10th Battalion received a message to advance
north west in support of its parent 4th Parachute
Brigade, still a mile to the west. The battalion
was caught by the Germans while forming up for
the foray, one company having been shredded
in 1st Parachute Brigade’s advance, in which
it was not supposed to take part. The 10th
Battalion, in Urquhart’s words, “disintegrated.”
It was arguably poor communications that were
responsible for the loss of the bulk of 10th
Battalion. At the same time, one company of the
7th Battalion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers
was captured when, evidently out of radio
contact, it retreated in the wrong direction and
was forced to surrender.
Apart from this, it has been contended, faulty
radio communications were not responsible for
the virtual loss of 4th Parachute Brigade. Poor
communications caused heavy and avoidable
casualties in 1st Parachute Brigade since the
battalions and companies were unable to coordinate their advances, sometimes running into
the same opposition which had frustrated an
earlier unit advance. Yet this was not the cause
of failure. By the time the German opposition
had solidified on D+1, with mortars, light flak
and armoured vehicles, there was really no
chance of relieving Frost at the bridge, even with
communications at their best.
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